1	The Origins of the British Battlecruisers An example of the prehistory of network-centric warfare Norman Friedman
2	Network-Centric Warfare The theme of much current “transformational” thinking Basically, tactical decisions are made on the basis of a wide-area picture created by a network of remote sensors By way of contrast, platform-centric means that the actor relies on whatever is on his own platform (e.g., ship) All –centric means is that it is where the key sensors are
3	The Problem Battlecruisers seemed, on their face, to be irrational – capital ships with insufficient armor to survive against other capital ships “Speed as protection” might barely make sense in conjunction with helm-free fire control (Pollard concept) – but the Royal Navy did not buy the necessary equipment The German battlecruisers were quite different in concept (they were fast battleships, trading armament for horsepower) So why did Fisher want to build ONLY battlecruisers?
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5	Royal Navy Roles, 1904 Trade Protection Imperial Security (against seaborne assault) Neutralization of enemy fleets (mainly by blockade) Main prospective enemies at this time are France and Russia Trade protection means protection against surface raiders, NOT submarines
6	Trade Protection Options Convoy Rejected by about 1870 as unaffordable Cruisers on patrol in “focal areas” Raiders would find themselves drawn to the “focal areas” as they snapped up shipping. By the 1890s these areas had been defined by elaborate Admiralty studies; there were about sixteen of them
7	The Crunch By 1900, prospective raiders are big armored or protected cruisers, rather than converted merchant ships a la CSS Alabama It takes at least one armored cruiser to deal with an armored cruiser A big armored cruiser costs as much as a battleship Numbers are set by the number of “focal areas,” not by the number of enemy cruisers It might take as many cruisers as the British had battleships (although they tried not to accept so brutal a reality)
8	Fisher’s Solution The battle cruiser is a “super armored cruiser” which can deal with several of the earlier type The trouble is that they would still need several battle cruisers per focal area – so they would only go bankrupt even faster But Fisher was brought into office specifically to solve a financial problem, not to create a worse one
9	A Hidden Factor By 1904, the Royal Navy was learning to use radio. Given radio, the Admiralty in London could function as an operational rather than as a simply administrative HQ But whether it could actually do so depended on how well it could form a picture of the global situation
10	The Global Picture By 1912, the Admiralty housed a pair of situation rooms (North Sea and global) Reports on shipping movements made it possible to deduce where a given ship had been sunk by a raider, and thus to estimate a raider’s movements This technique was used during the hunt for SMS Emden in 1914 Note that the battle cruisers were given particularly tall masts so that they would enjoy unusually long radio receiving range
11	Vectoring Given an estimated raider position, course, and speed, a fast ship could be sent to intercept her Vectoring would be, in theory, far more efficient than placing ships on patrol at focal areas In fact navigation was only approximate, and a single ship would not suffice. It would be necessary to form hunting groups: a battle cruiser and several light cruisers, for example Vectoring was never discussed publicly, and no explicit mention has been found. But it certainly fits other British practices of the pre-1914 period, and it is what the British did when faced by German raiders in 1914.
12	Some Additional Evidence: The Abortive Pacific Fleet The British tried to convince the Pacific Dominions to form “fleet units” which could either hunt down raiders or which could coalesce into a fleet powerful enough to deal with the Japanese; only the Australians agreed The fleet unit was a battle cruiser plus light cruisers – exactly the ideal for vectoring
13	The British Battle Cruisers A rational solution to a problem of great importance before the alliance with France and Russia came into force Never explained, hence it was not obvious when its rationale began to crumble Hardly the irrational romantic concept often attributed to Fisher Extremely unlucky at Jutland
14	Why Does It Matter? Network-centric concepts may form the basis for future U.S. military development They are usually discussed on a very abstract plane Naval examples give a sense of what they are, of how they work, and also of how they may fail in practice Naval examples can help clarify what is needed to make this sort of concept work
15	Problems Pre-1914, it was very rare to find analysis of just what was needed to make tactics work. Keys to vectoring were intelligence and navigation. British intelligence was remarkably good, but not good enough. Navigation was flawed, but the problem was not well enough known nor were its implications appreciated
16	Vectoring in War: World War I War brought with it exactly the sensor vectoring required: radio intercepts including D/F Jutland was a victory of British vectoring: the Grand Fleet intercepted the High Seas Fleet on the far side of the North Sea That the Germans were clueless is indicated by the name they gave the battle, Skaggerak
17	Some Consequences of Vectoring Efficient use of force – the Grand Fleet did not risk itself on patrol Surprise -- the Germans never expected to meet the whole Grand Fleet Economy of effort – the British did not have to fill the North Sea with scouts, although they did keep submarines on patrol off the German coast Of course, once battle was joined, this was not enough to save the British battle cruisers