-- Alfred Thayer Mahan,

By September of 1861, the threat of secession in Maryland had been successfully thwarted with the arrest of the secessionist members of the state legislature and the partial military occupation of the state. Thus, Anna Ella Carroll could turn her attention to another facet of the Lincoln Administration's war effort: the plans for military operations in the West.

In the early fall, Anna Ella Carroll advised Asst. Secty. of War Thomas A. Scott that she was planning to visit relatives in St. Louis for the purpose of familiarizing herself with the local military situation and to do research on her second war powers paper. "He urged me to go, asking me to write him fully of every point and fact investigated." En route she visited various military encampments including Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman's in Louisville, Kentucky. Carroll wrote of her trip, "I had a cordial welcome at all the military camps from most in command."

Once in St. Louis, Carroll met Lemuel Evans, a Unionist from Texas, essentially in exile because of the war. Evans had been elected a Know-Nothing Congressman from east Texas in 1855 and attended the national convention in Philadelphia in 1856 where he and Carroll first may have met. He had originally been sent West by Secretary of State Seward as a secret government agent seeking to return to Texas, but had not left yet due to military conditions in the Southwest. While in the city he was also engaged in writing. Evans and Carroll saw each other almost daily and frequently discussed the military situation in that department. 1.

The military situation at that time was not encouraging for Union folk residing in either the East or the West. Due to political pressure and over the objections of General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, President Lincoln had pressed his military commanders for a battle in July of 1861. The result was the first Battle of Bull Run which was both a military and psychological defeat for the Union. By December, Union naval forces occupied parts of the Carolina coast; Gen. Nathaniel Lyon and his mostly German-American troops from St. Louis had secured the state of Missouri for the federals, having chased the pro-Southern governor and his troops into its southwest corner. Otherwise, prospects for a significant defeat of Confederate forces or a major advance into their territory looked dim throughout the fall and early winter.

In November, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan took over command of the Union armies from the retiring General Scott. Since the summer of 1861, Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, the Pathfinder of the West, had been in charge of the armies there, from his headquarters located in St. Louis. Because of a lack of military successes, rumors of corruption, and some impolitic deeds, Lincoln replaced Fremont with Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck in November. Halleck's reputation as a military strategist had preceded him. He had written, Elements of Military Art and Science, and translated Jomini's Life of Napoleon. Events would show he did have a good eye for strategy, but was weaker on implementation. Yet during his first months of command, Halleck effectively organized and trained his forces and kept a lid on the simmering conflict in Missouri. At the same time, Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, a McClellan protégé, took over from Sherman as commander of the Department of the Ohio. 2.

The major planned military operation in the West was one to send Union ironclad gun- and mortar boats down the Mississippi river to open that great trade route to the upper Middle West. Fremont stated in later Congressional testimony that although he took over the command without being furnished a plan of campaign, "The general discussions at Washington resulted in the understanding that the great object in view was the descent of the Mississippi, and for its accomplishment I was to raise and organize an army, and when I was ready to descend the river I was to let the President know."

Credit for this effort can be given to Gen. Winfield Scott and Atty. Gen. Edward Bates. In the spring of 1861, Scott proposed what became known as the "Anaconda" plan that called for a Union naval blockade and the opening of the Mississippi by a land and river force; thus the arterial strangulation of the South would be accomplished in the manner of the South American reptile, the plan's namesake. Bates was a friend of James B. Eads, the St. Louis engineer and eventual contractor for the gunboats. Eads had put in touch with the Navy Department, first suggesting the establishment of a base at Cairo, Illinois and that a river snagboat be converted to a gunboat to blockade Southern commerce on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Ultimately, the submission of Eads's plan led to the approval for the construction of a gunboat fleet. The engines and crew quarters of the wide-beamed, flat-bottom, 13-gun ships were protected by sloped casement sheathed with 2.5 inches of iron armor, giving them the appearance of turtle-shelled floating fortresses. Indeed, they became known as "Pook's turtles" after the casement designer. Asst. Secty. of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox suggested the idea of the mortar boats that were schooners and scows loaded with 13-inch mortars. By August 1861, construction of seven of the newly designed ironclads and thirty-eight mortar boats had begun in St. Louis and Mound City, Illinois; other boats had been purchased previously and were retrofitted.

In September, Capt. Andrew Hull Foote, known as the "Stonewall Jackson" of the U.S. Navy (as of November, Flag Officer), assumed command of naval operations on the Western rivers. Foote was a dynamic, principled naval leader whose adventuring Puritan ancestors had settled the state of Connecticut. While on station off China, he had achieved a stunning combat victory at the Battle of the Barrier Forts in Canton in 1856. A tenacious, religious, temperance man, he was the strongest advocate for eliminating the daily grog ration and was one of the few captains who doggedly pursued slavers off the African coast. In his new assignment, Foote labored under much personal strain and considerable bureaucratic difficulties supervising construction of the gunboat fleet. At the end of December 1861, he wrote Fox, "I only wish that you could have spent one day here, for the last six weeks, as no imagination can fancy what it is, to collect materials and fit out Western Gun Boats with Western men, without a Navy yard--in the West where no stores are to be had." Obstacles partly arose from the fact that all of the ironclads and mortar boats were being built simultaneously, stretching already thin resources.

After Halleck's arrival Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was assigned to command the District of Cairo where Foote's gunboats would be centered, and the area comprising the mouths of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers on the Kentucky side of the Ohio. Grant who needs little introduction was a terse, modest, cigar-smoking, West Point graduate and Mexican War veteran from Galena, Illinois. He and Foote had not previously worked together, but they were like-minded which is not surprising, as both their families were originally from the hardscrabble state of Connecticut. Both men conducted their business with gritty, bulldog determination and a strong sense of professionalism. Grant wrote that he and Foote freely exchanged views on operations about which they were in solid agreement. 3.

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Beyond being the font of strategic plans, the Mississippi River was critical to the Union war effort for economic and political reasons. Anna Ella Carroll's and others' contributions to its opening can only be appreciated by understanding the relationship between these factors and the Union victory in 1865.

Given the amount of manpower and resources the Northwestern states ultimately furnished the Union, it was imperative that political support for the Lincoln Administration be maintained in the area. The Mississippi River had to be opened in order for that abundant agricultural region to have outlets for trade and, thus, maintain its economic vitality. Following secession the Confederates seized the lower Mississippi, the Union naval blockade was instituted, and the river trade collapsed which threw the Northwest into a grave economic depression in 1861-62. Great farm surpluses were created, as grain and livestock could not be sold, and farm prices plummeted. In some sections corn prices were less than 10 cents a bushel and in 1861, hog prices were halved. The commercial and financial markets were also thrown into chaos. Before the war many Midwestern states had invested heavily in Southern state bonds which were used to back local paper currency. Once these securities began to depreciate, many banks went under, leaving a shortage of currency with which to finance the fall harvests. In July 1861, in the state of Wisconsin alone, thirty-eight banks declared bankruptcy. In addition, once the Mississippi River was closed to trade, farmers were put at the mercy of the railroads for transportation of goods to markets. The railroads, taking full advantage of this situation, more than doubled their freight rates. 4.

Click on the map for a larger image

On a purely perceptual basis the opening of the Mississippi was important to Lincoln, for on it hinged support in his primary political base. The new administration would be greatly threatened, to say nothing of embarrassed, if Lincoln lost support for the war effort in his home region. As the Northwest went, so probably would go the rest of the country. As early as March 1861, Bates wrote in his diary that, "If the present difficulties [Fort Sumter] should continue and grow, I am convinced that the real struggle will be at the Mis[sis]sippi for it is not politically possible for any foreign power to hold the mouth of that river, against the people of the middle and upper vall[e]y." Thus for the Northwest, control of the Mississippi, in and of itself, was a war issue. In May, the governors of the states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania met in Cleveland to determine how they might best coordinate efforts to support the national government. From that conference came a memorial which in part urged the President to make the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers the principal base of operations against the enemy. By 1862, the political situation had become so grave that various parties, North and South, entertained thoughts of forming a Northwest confederacy to negotiate a separate peace with the South, partly to gain use of the Mississippi River. 5.

For the Confederates, control of the Mississippi River Valley also meant economic and political survival. The river flows more than 2,000 miles and it or its tributaries drained seventeen Northern, Border, and Southern states. It served as a breadbasket for the South, as well as the North. In addition control of the river determined the South's ability to access supplies such as sugar, grain, and beef from Texas and powder, copper, lead, saltpeter, specie, and other materials imported through Mexico. The railroad lines that crossed the river constituted the South's internal logistical and communications lines, allowing supplies and troops to move east-west.

As Lemuel Evans wrote in a pamphlet defending Carroll's claim to the Tennessee River campaign plan, the Mississippi River valley was also a political keystone:

Although the Mississippi River was a critical trade route and its possession held the key to Lincoln's political survival in the region these facts did not necessarily mean that the River was the best line of invasion. As will be discussed later, it could have taken years just to secure the river itself for Northern trade. And as for providing a means of invasion for troops, what would the Union forces have done once they landed on the eastern banks of the Mississippi River? Perhaps after taking major losses just getting onto Confederate territory, they would have been situated with their backs to the river facing Confederate armies massed along potentially hundreds of miles of front lines. However, there were other strategic options.

The Chinese character for crisis is a representation of two others that denote "danger" and "opportunity". In the winter of 1861-62, the Mississippi River Valley represented both a grave danger for the Union as well as its best strategic opportunity. As the British military historian, J. F. C. Fuller has written, the theater of war east of the Appalachias was, ". . . .'the stage of the great political operations. . .in. . .which the chief object was to win world support by seizing either Richmond or Washington, or by striking at Pennsylvania--the key State of the North. The theater west of the mountains, however, was the 'great strategic' arena." Geography formed the basis for the difference, The lower Mississippi Valley both produced the victuals of war and cradled the "web-like river system" that could be employed to plunge a military dagger into the heartland of the Confederacy to begin its vivisection. Whereas in Virginia, the river systems ran perpendicular to Northern lines of invasion, the rivers and railroads of the Mississippi River valley ran parallel to them. At that time the use of rail facilities was the fastest way of moving and concentrating forces. However, tracks and bridges can be destroyed, but rivers can't. So the rivers of this valley offered the best opportunities for strategic mass movement of Union troops.

Conversely, Confederate success would have been a mirror image of Union failure, that is, victory snatched from the jaws of Northern inaction. The South's best chance of achieving independence was to carry out a successful defensive campaign, prevent a full-scale invasion and disruption of internal communications and supply lines, and gain European recognition. Thus, peace would be demanded by a war-weary and financially drained North. By January 1862, these events were close to being realized. A continuing threat existed that England and France, deprived of their vital cotton supplies, would recognize the Confederacy, if not intervene and raise the naval blockade of the South. The public treasury was being drawn down at a rate of $ 2 million dollars per day and Treasury notes were beginning to fall on the market.

As Evans pointed out, although the South was primarily an agricultural region:

In the autumn of '61, the Confederate States had acquired an organization and consistency, strong enough to put in the field and maintain a military power too formidable to be overthrown by any power the National Government could bring against it, on any of the lines of operation known to the administration.

If this rebel power could gain time to prepare for replenishing its warlike material by the creation of machine power, it was numerous enough and rich enough in intellectual and material resources to resist indefinitely, if not able to destroy the Union altogether. No blockade could so curtail its supplies of warlike material but what was rapidly being supplemented by the energies of the people.

Could the National armies, however, penetrate the central region so as to break up their internal lines of connection and, at the same time, disorganize their industrial system, the Confederacy would be geographically cut in two, and their ability to create resources for large armies forever destroyed. 7.

To prevent invasion, the Confederate northern defensive line had to be held across several hundreds of miles of territory which centered at the Mississippi river and extended from the Alleghenies to Kansas and Indian territory. However, if Union armies could penetrate the line at any point, Confederate forces to the north of either side of an invasion might be forced to retreat south to prevent being cut off and surrounded.

Unfortunately in the winter of 1861-62, the Union had no generals who thought in these geo-political strategic terms. Lincoln quipped that his only war experience had been fighting mosquitoes as an enlisted man in the Black Hawk War in Illinois. With the exception of Winfield Scott, who was about to retire, in the early months of the Civil War the Lincoln Administration lacked the political and military minds that could make broad policy decisions concerning the major theaters of military operations. Success was thought of in terms of winning battles and taking capitals, not winning the war. Richmond was in a strong position as troops defending it were in their home territory and operated on interior lines, a number of rivers had to be crossed from Washington to reach it, and its surrounding terrain was difficult. Moreover, the city was a transparent target and forces had to move within a somewhat confined area. Tactically, troops had to overcome strong defenses that were protected by musket and rifle ranges which could go up to 300 yards. If the Union had found no line of invasion that could cut deep into the Southern interior, a protracted stalemate such as that experienced by the Allies in World War I may have resulted.

In contrast in the West, with the exception of a few strategic centers such as Vicksburg, New Orleans, and Atlanta, armies became the strategic targets and territory was occupied. Therefore, a war of maneuver could be more easily fought as specific objectives along a line of march or naval incursion were not always clear and there was geographic room to mass and maneuver troops. For instance the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers offered the advantages of: a northern river flow into the Confederates' rear; better navigability along a straighter course for large steamers; a good supply and communications line from the North (at the time twenty-tree rail lines ran south from Chicago); and the strategic ability to turn right to the Mississippi or left toward Richmond. By opening a line of invasion in the West, the Northern armies could mass and concentrate their forces using the rivers and railroads, build strategic advantages, achieve forward movement, cut up and occupy territory, and begin a geographic attrition of the Confederacy.

Although on the surface they looked much more promising, in actuality the South's prospects for engaging in a successful defensive operation were not very encouraging in that winter of 1861-62. From the beginning, the best thing they had going for them was their commander. By Special Orders No. 149, Albert Sidney Johnston, a graduate of West Point and veteran of the Mexican War, was appointed General Commanding the Western Department of the Army of the Confederate States of America on September 10, 1861 Johnston was highly regarded by military men North and South; in his memoirs Grant later wrote, "His contemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would produce." 8.

Upon arriving at his headquarters in Nashville, Johnston had his work cut out for him. By November, he had 33,000 ill-equipped and poorly trained troops pitted against some 60,000 federal ones. His main strategic job was to check federal movement along the 400 miles that stretched between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi. Along this line five places were pierced by rivers or railroads. Because of the lack of good east-west rail connections, moving troops laterally from Virginia or locally to reinforce various points, would prove difficult. The two locations serving as the anchors for the Confederate line were Columbus, Kentucky on the shores of the Mississippi and the Cumberland Gap in the eastern part of the state. The major federal encampments were Cairo, Illinois that controlled access to the Mississippi and Ohio rivers; Paducah, Kentucky also on the Ohio; and Camp Dick Robinson near Louisville. In September, Johnston had made the decision to make Kentucky the Confederate northern defensive line and sent Brig. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner to occupy an additional point, Bowling Green. In his letter to Jefferson Davis, he also complained of a lack of troops and arms--his hope being to hold his line until reinforcements came and support within the state could be organized. Initially Johnston's greatest challenge was to conceal from the enemy his paltry numbers and equipment while readying his army to withstand a major Union attack. In an effort to make good his bluff, from September on, Johnston had small units of infantry and cavalry engage Union troops occupying exposed positions along their line and sent out heavy reconnaissances, trying to create an impression of an, "'advance guard of a menacing force.'" As of November 1861, Johnston's skirmishing had proved successful. Sherman ultimately gave up his command of the Department of the Ohio because he believed the Confederates would be able to "walk into" Louisville.

Johnston also guarded his naval flanks. A Northern advance with its strong gunboat fleet was taken for granted. Thus, Confederates reinforced Mississippi River garrisons at Columbus, Island No. 10, Memphis, and Vicksburg. Yet, "So fully were they [the Confederates] possessed of the theory [of a direct descent] that they immeasurably neglected the possibility of invasion by way of the Cumberland and Tennessee." Although, the Tennessee state government had ordered the construction of Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland to guard against advances south, this effort came late. Johnston continued construction, but only after he occupied his headquarters in Nashville in November, and perceived that the central rivers would be Nashville's defensive line. 9.

As for the Union forces, although positioned better, the worst thing they had going for them initially were their commanders. Don Carlos Buell seemed to have the same kind of "slows", as Lincoln put it, that McClellan did. Like McClellan in the East, Buell wanted to move only when he felt his troops were well prepared. So "the Army of the Ohio lay in camp and gathered strength and waited." Meanwhile, Halleck, situated in St. Louis, felt it was all he could do to maintain federal control in that state which was immersed in a Byzantine civil war all of its own. 10. So as of December 1861, President Lincoln had no one on whom he could rely for broad strategic war planning, and three of his top generals had mired the U.S. armies in a Serbonian bog of inaction.

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Meanwhile Carroll was located in St. Louis, making use of the Mercantile Library to research her next legal paper for the administration. Edward William Johnston, the stubborn and outspoken older brother of Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, was the head librarian there. He was happy to share Confederate confidence that there was no way to take the Mississippi and that the conflict would be over by spring. As Carroll later wrote:

I gained a great deal of information as to what was expected to be accomplished. . . .While assuming great confidence in the Union cause I confess my apprehension of danger grew daily more intense and my determination to find some mode of solution stronger. . . .I saw that battle torn regiment the 7th Iowa, as it fled into Benton Barracks that memorable autumn morning, after the Battle of Belmont. It so sickened my heart--and a conviction fastened upon me, that there was a way of escape, that either the Tennessee or Cumberland Rivers might afford the needed depth of water for the passage of the gunboats into the heart of the South. I meant to find out if I remained there a month longer. It struck me the pilots ought to be able to satisfy one as to the depth & width of all the western rivers. I resolved to see them, for I knew the high military men would never inquire of them as I told General Grant long after. 11.

During her stay in St. Louis, Carroll was a guest at the Everett House, a local hotel. She asked the proprietor how she could get in touch with one of the river boat pilots and he told her the wife of one was staying at the hotel. She called on a Mrs. Charles M. Scott whose husband was a pilot connected with the Mississippi expedition and was told that she would send her husband to see her. When Captain Scott returned to St. Louis after the Battle of Belmont, Carroll sent a note requesting him to call.

As later related in pages of congressional testimony, when Scott called, Carroll began to question him on the merits of the Mississippi River expedition. Scott told her that it was:

. . . .impossible to reduce Columbus [Kentucky] with the gunboats without a very large co-operating land force, and after a very long siege; that the gunboats were not suited to fight on the Mississippi, on account of its strong current; that there were a great many positions on the Mississippi that the enemy could make as strong as Columbus; that they would be fortified as our fleet descended, so that innumerable battles must be fought, and it would take years to open that river; and this, he said, was the belief of every pilot connected with the expedition.

Then Carroll "inquired as to the navigability of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers". Scott responded that the Cumberland was navigable for gunboats to Nashville and the Tennessee was at all stages to the Muscle Shoals in Alabama. Upon the mention of the navigability of the Tennessee River, the thought flashed through Carroll's mind of diverting the intended invasion from the Mississippi to the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.

Then, "Judge Evans. . .fortunately called at that moment. I was greatly excited at the thought and meeting him in the hall, inquired if that movement could not be made. . . .and I invited him to come and join me in interrogation of the Pilot, Mr. Scott, on all his special knowledge. . . .". Upon hearing of the idea, Evans concurred that this was the move and they proceeded to question Scott in more depth.

In answer to our inquiries, Captain Scott stated the draft and speed of the gunboats, and number of guns; the width and depth of the channel of the Mississippi; the number of bluffs upon the river, and the wide extent of the swamp or overflowed lands; also the width and depth of the channel of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. He did not think the gunboats could pass over Muscle Shoals, in Alabama. We inquired as to the practicability of the naval expedition reaching Mobile, and as to the navigability of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers. He thought the fleet could not pass the bar, some seven miles below that city; said the Tombigbee afforded good steamboat navigation to Demopolis, which is one hundred and fifty miles from the Muscle Shoals, in the Tennessee river.

Scott was familiar with these rivers as he had "traveled on foot from Memphis to where the town of Eastport (in the northwest corner of Mississippi) now stands, in 1832, and again when the Chickasaw Indians were removed to Arkansas." He had "made other trips as a young man on flatboats bound for New Orleans."

At Judge Evans's suggestion, Carroll requested Scott to give her a memo as to the facts of the situation, telling him that it was her purpose to induce the government to change its plan and divert the Mississippi expedition up the Tennessee River. Scott was at first reluctant to do this because, as he confessed, he was not very literate. She insisted and requested him to write to her from time to time giving her information from the field. In later congressional hearings, Carroll testified that her conversation with Scott not only impressed her with the idea that the Tennessee River was the true line of invasion but that, "On learning the navigability of the Tennessee I perceived the strategic advance of an army up that stream to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and with such clearness and strength of conviction as to secure its realization. . . ."12.

The same day Carroll wrote Atty. Gen. Edward Bates and Asst. Secty. of War Thomas A. Scott urging the importance of a change of campaign. Soon thereafter, Carroll left St. Louis to return to Washington. Upon her return she saw Scott who, ". . . .said he had received my letter from St. Louis, and shown it to the President who was as anxious as himself to see me back and hear all I had to say." Carroll then prepared a complete statement of the plan and presented it to the Assistant Secretary on November 30, 1861.

The civil and military authorities seem to be laboring under a great mistake in regard to the true key of the war in the Southwest. It is not the Mississippi but the Tennessee river. All the military preparations made in the West indicate that the Mississippi river is the point to which the authorities are directing their attention. On that river many battles must be fought and heavy risks incurred before any impression can be made on the enemy, all of which could be avoided by using the Tennessee river. This river is navigable for middle class boats to the foot of the Muscle Shoals in Alabama, and is open to navigation all the year, while the distance is but two hundred and fifty miles by the river from Paducah, on the Ohio. The Tennessee offers many advantages over the Mississippi. We should avoid the almost impregnable batteries of the enemy, which cannot be taken without great danger and great risk of life to our forces, from the fact that our boats, if crippled, would fall a prey to the enemy by being swept by the current to him, and away from the relief of our friends. But even should we succeed, still we will only have begun the war, for we shall then have to fight the country from whence the enemy derives his supplies.

Now, an advance up the Tennessee river would avoid this danger; for, if our boats were crippled, they would drop back with the current and escape capture.

But a still greater advantage would be its tendency to cut the enemy's lines in two, by reaching the Memphis and Charleston railroad, threatening Memphis, which lies one hundred miles due west, and no defensible point between; also Nashville, only ninety miles northeast, and Florence and Tuscumbia, in North Alabama, forty miles east. A movement in this direction would do more to relieve our friends in Kentucky, and inspire the loyal hearts in East Tennessee than the possession of the whole of the [M]ississippi river. If well ex[e]cuted, it would cause the evacuation of all the formidable fortifications upon which the rebels ground their hopes for success; and, in the event of our fleet attacking Mobile, the presence of our troops in the northern part of Alabama would be material aid to the fleet.

Again, the aid our forces would receive from the loyal men in Tennessee would enable them soon to crush the last traitor in that region, and the separation of the two extremes would do more than one hundred battles for the Union cause.

The Tennessee river is crossed by the Memphis and Louisville railroad and the Memphis and Nashville railroad. At Hamburg the river makes the big bend on the east, touching the northeast corner of Mississippi, entering the northwest corner of Alabama, forming an arc to the south, entering the State of Tennessee at the northeast corner of Alabama, and if it does not touch the northwest corner of Georgia, comes very near it. It is but eight miles from Hamburg to Memphis and Charleston railroad, which goes through Tuscumbia, only two miles from the river, which it crosses at Decatur, thirty miles above, intersecting with the Nashville and Chattanooga road at Stephenson. The Tennessee river has never less than three feet to Hamburg on the ‘shoalest’ bar, and, during the fall, winter, and spring months, there is always water for the largest boats that are used on the Mississippi river. It follows from the above facts that in making the Mississippi the key to the war in the West, or rather in overlooking the Tennessee river, the subject is not understood by the superiors in command. 13.

Scott was clearly in a position to be familiar with Southern rail facilities and to appreciate the importance of being able to move troops by water and rail. Previously he had been a vice president of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad and had been brought into the War Department by Secretary of War Cameron to coordinate government use of telegraphs and railroads. As Carroll later told it:

After reading my plan and hearing my verbal arguments, Mr. Scott's countenance brightened and he exclaimed, 'Miss Carroll, I believe you have solved the question.' He hurried at once, with the plan in his hands to the White House and with much excitement gave it to the President. Mr. Lincoln read it with avidity, and when he had finished it Mr. Scott told me that he had never witnessed such delight as he evinced."

As the document came from no one connected with the military it was decided not to reveal the source and the paper was left unsigned. Carroll said she allowed this to be done, "caring absolutely nothing in those supreme moments, if it but saved the country, whether it should be denied or forgotten that she was its author."

This account was basically confirmed by Captain Scott in an interview conducted with the St. Louis River Pilot newspaper on June 16, 1874. During this time Scott was claiming that the Tennessee River plan was his idea and Carroll was only the messenger carrying it by hand to Washington (see chapter on congressional hearings), but the general facts corroborate Carroll. Notes in the newspaper morgue files read, "This [the plan] was sent care of Miss Carroll for the war dept." and "the authorities were delighted." Further, "In December she wrote again to Scott saying that the campaign up the Tenn. R. was resolved on, and asking Scott to hold himself ready to accompany the expedition."

On January 5, Carroll sent a letter to Assistant Secretary Scott giving additional thoughts on the movement, based on more field data sent to her by Charles Scott.

Then immediately after the fall of Fort Henry, she suggested to Secretary Stanton the practicability of advancing the army onward to Mobile or Vicksburg.

Later testimony given by Sen. Benjamin F. Wade, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, revealed that it was the fact that the plan was devised by a civilian which caused the delay in its implementation. According to Blackwell, McClellan opposed it. He and other high ranking officers in the army either had the backing of politicians in Congress or were former politicians themselves. These men were aware that whichever generals were responsible for major victories, they would be more-than-viable candidates for the presidency. Although in some cases politicians may have added a degree of ineptness to the army, Lincoln recognized that he had to give military commissions to Republican and Democratic office holders in order to maintain support for the war. 14.

In the winter of 1861-62, the administration's hold on the politicians and the country was slipping for want of a military victory. Excerpts from congressional proceedings portray the sense of desperation of the members. Rep. Henry L. Dawes estimated that the Treasury of the United States would not be able to finance the war beyond the next sixty days. On January 7, 1862, Sen. Henry Wilson of Massachusetts stated:

On January 29, House member John A. Gurley of Ohio expressed his frustration:

As late as February 4, two days before the fall of Fort Henry on the Tennessee, Rep. Roscoe Conkling of New York spoke:

Blackwell wrote that President Lincoln, ". . . .saw from the beginning the vital importance of regaining the Mississippi and controlling the resources of its great valley, and therefore reserved to himself the direction of this expedition as Commander- in-chief." Carroll's plan convinced him that the Tennessee River would provide the Union great strategic advantages, yet was it doable? As Judge Evans testified on Carroll's behalf, up until she submitted her paper:

According to Wade's later testimony the appointment of Edwin Stanton as secretary of war was part and parcel of this perception.

By January 1862, it was clear that Secty. of War Simon Cameron, the political and corporate magnate from Pennsylvania, had to go Many men in the Congress did not trust him, the Committee on the Conduct of the War was finding graft and corruption in the government contracts being let, and Thaddeus Stevens went so far as to tell President Lincoln that he thought Cameron was so dishonest he would steal a red hot stove. Thus on January 11, 1862, the President requested Cameron's resignation. 17.

On January 15, Edwin M. Stanton was confirmed by the Senate as secretary of war. Stanton's appointment mystified many. Although he had the backing of Chase, Cameron, and Seward, he was still an unlikely candidate in that some thought there was lingering animosity between he and the President dating from a case they had tried before the war; in the nine months since Lincoln had taken office, it was well known in Washington that  had not felt favorably about the administration. Finally, he had been attorney general in Buchanan's Democratic Cabinet. This would not have endeared him to the Republican members of Congress. According to A. K. McClure, the head of the Pennsylvania Senate Military Committee on the War, the nomination came as a surprise as, ". . . .there was not a single member of his Cabinet who had knowledge of his purpose to do so until it was done. . . ." According to Wade, however, Lincoln selected Stanton partly because Wade convinced him that Stanton would implement the Tennessee River plan, over potential objections from the military and members of Congress. In a statement submitted as a letter (dated April 4, 1876) to the congressional committee investigating Carroll's claim Wade wrote:

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 1

Thus, one day after Lincoln decided to take "matters into his own hands", he issued the above directive. It appears that Lincoln envisioned the move up the Tennessee to be part of an overall advance of Union forces, east and west. His concept was to overwhelm the enemy at all points with superior force. If the Confederates weakened one point and strengthened another, the weak one would be seized. Moreover, Lincoln was putting the weight of the whole government behind the order. Also on the 27th Stanton wrote Wade confidentially, "An order this day been made by the President requiring all the armies in the field to place themselves in fighting order immediately and to commence operations by a certain specific day. . . . .It is no less important that Congress should at once place itself in fighting condition by the rule for Executive Session in both houses.

In response, Wade introduced a resolution in the Senate that would change the rules of both houses to enable them to go into secret session to discuss measures to suppress the rebellion. Also on the 27th, he stated that it ought to be acted on immediately:

. . . .in contemplation of certain things [i.e., the President's War Order]. . . . Gentlemen do not seem to consider that we are now in flagrant war before the capital. . . .It is true this war is so much like peace so far that I do not wonder that gentlemen do not really consider that there is war almost at our doors [laughter]. But, sir, although the war lies dormant, still there is war; and it is not intended that it shall remain in this quiescent state much longer. The committee to which I have the honor to belong are determined, so far as they can exert any influence upon this Government, that it shall move, and move with energy.

In her later memorials, Carroll quoted this statement as proof of Wade's support of Lincoln's planned movement up the Tennessee.

The final pieces in the puzzle are memos regarding information received about Confederate Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard being sent west to aid Johnston. On January 29, McClellan wired Halleck and Buell that Beauregard was under orders to go to Kentucky, "A deserter just in from the rebels says that Beauregard had not left Centreville four days ago, but that as he was going on picket he heard officers say that Beauregard was under order to go to Kentucky with fifteen regiments from the [Confed.] Army of the Potomac." The next day on the 30th, Halleck wrote McClellan, "Your telegraph respecting Beauregard is received. General Grant and Commodore Foote will be ordered to immediately advance, and to reduce and hold Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, and also to cut the railroad between Dover and Paris." 32.

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Putting all of this together one can conclude as previously stated, that the receipt of Carroll's plan, coupled with the political pressures to advance and the failure to complete construction of the mortar boats, convinced the administration to abandon its plans for the Mississippi expedition and make the advance up the Tennessee River. Although Henry Walke stated that it was Halleck's memo of January 20 that convinced the administration to forgo the Mississippi plan, as stated previously, there is no evidence that McClellan shared Halleck's views with Lincoln and Lincoln's own writings indicate that he made the decision on January 26. Even though Carroll tried to make the case herself, it is immaterial who first thought of the idea, as it could and should have occurred to any competent military mind, as others have noted. Given his own thinking and the sequence of events in January, Halleck certainly would have ordered Grant and Foote to make the move regardless. Moreover, in government it's implementation that counts, as multitudes of plans have sat in officers' desk drawers gathering dust during many a war.

In the context of 1861-62, what was different about Carroll's and Halleck's thinking was that it constituted a single thrust up the Tennessee rather than a broader movement as Buell had envisioned. According to Sherman one night in December 1861, he and Chief-of-Staff Cullum were having dinner with Halleck in his room at the Planter's House in St. Louis. Afterward, they discussed the "much-talked-of-advance"; most persons advocated a Mississippi River movement. Halleck took out a map, the Confederate defensive line was drawn, and he asked the officers where was the proper point to break the line. Either Sherman or Cullum responded, "Naturally the center" which was at the Tennessee River. Halleck then said, "That's the true line of operations." However, as Wade wrote, even Lincoln recognized such a maneuver was risky, albeit obvious. This made the question of Union reinforcements also critical. Yet it appears that Carroll was the only one to present such a plan to Lincoln, as there is no evidence that McClellan shared Halleck's views regarding the Tennessee line with the President.

Although the St. Louis River Pilot article stated that Carroll wrote at the beginning of December the plan was decided on, quotes from Lincoln contradict this. Lincoln later may have encountered opposition from McClellan and/or others. The President also clearly wanted the military men to take responsibility for movements and, over and over again, pressed them to act. However, by January 26, he could wait no longer. Fox's January 27 memo to Foote stating a change of program, along with Lincoln's war order, and Halleck's order to Foote on the 29th to be ready to move, also suggest that Washington did communicate its wishes to Halleck, although this is not totally clear.

General War Order No. 1 then was issued on January 27 with the intent indicated, a movement of all Union forces east and west. The Tennessee expedition, replacing that on the Mississippi, thus, would be one facet of an overall strategic effort. But events interceded. The information received about Beauregard being sent to reinforce Johnston, so alarmed the administration that they allowed Foote's and Grant's movement on Fort Henry with the gunboats and crews ready at the time. Fortunately for the Union, only Beauregard himself (without reinforcing troops) was sent to Kentucky, whence upon his arrival he and Johnston disagreed on a basic plan of action concerning concentration of Confederate forces. 33.

Halleck's previous complaints about lack of troops, as well as Carroll's memo, also made the administration aware that they were not prepared for a major movement of Union forces in the West. Thus, Lincoln and Stanton sent Assistant Secretary of War Scott to organize reinforcements in the Midwest to be sent to Grant and Buell. Scott's activities verify that the advance on Fort Henry was not a solitary tactical venture, but constituted the beginning of the major Union thrust into the Confederacy which was what Carroll's plan had outlined.

Scott's job was to develop information on, ". . . .the number and location of the troops, their degree of organization and equipment, and the time by which they would be ready for the field." He also was to report on the facilities for rail and other transportation in each military department; the governors of each state were to submit weekly reports on the progress of mobilization in their states. Evidence of his directive is found in a letter written to Stanton on February 1, and by Scott's own later congressional testimony. The letter from Scott to Stanton read in part, "In accordance with your instructions under date of January 29, I left Washington the same evening for Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and the Western Department." Scott also submitted congressional testimony verifying Carroll's contribution and discussing his part in the mobilization.

Hon. Henry Wilson

Chairman, Military Committee, U. S. Senate 34.

That Scott was ordered West reveals that Lincoln and Stanton recognized that neither Halleck nor Buell had the wherewithal to organize the necessary reinforcements, transportation, and logistical support for such an effort.

Although Halleck, Grant, and Foote clearly deserve the lion's share of the credit for the success of the Tennessee River campaign, even by conservative standards one can say that Carroll contributed the following: she was instrumental in forcing a major change in administration plans as to military operations in the West; she hastened Cameron's dismissal and precipitated Stanton's appointment; with Halleck's advance McClellan was left with no choice but to support the program; and Carroll aided in the achievement of internal consensus on one of the major strategic decisions of the war. The general arguments and technical detail of her plan would also have given the administration confidence to massively reinforce Halleck's advance upon Fort Henry. Finally, the advance up the Tennessee River was the beginning of the end of McClellan's military career.

Moreover, Carroll's strategic thinking was more accurate than Halleck's in regard to the importance of the Memphis-Charleston Railroad. As she predicted as Union forces advanced up the Tennessee, the Confederates had to relinquish the state of Kentucky; Johnston evacuated Bowling Green after Fort Henry, then Columbus and Nashville after Fort Donelson, the Confederate line in eastern Kentucky having collapsed earlier following Thomas's victory over Crittenden at Mills Springs. From there Johnston's and Beauregard's forces from Columbus moved south to the town of Corinth, Mississippi to unite and make a stand to protect the Memphis-Charleston Railroad. Both Grant and Buell moved their respective armies toward that position in pursuit of Johnston.

Meanwhile Thomas Scott was traveling with Union advance forces trying to help coordinate between Halleck and Buell. On March 6 Halleck wrote him as to Beauregard's intentions in occupying Corinth, "It is his best point to cover Memphis and Chattanooga. What a mistake that Buell did not send forces to move with us up the Tennessee River, so as to seize that point. . . .I cannot make Buell understand the importance of strategic points till it is too late." Then on the 13th Buell wrote Halleck, "All information goes to show that the enemy is concentrating along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at the great southern bend of the Tennessee. Decatur seems to be the main point, but they also occupy Huntsville, Corinth and several intermediate points, besides Jackson and Humboldt." In order to facilitate troop movements in the area, Lincoln issued President's War Order No. 3 on March 11, relieving Buell of his departmental command and placing Halleck in charge of all union forces west of Knoxville, henceforth known as the Department of the Mississippi. In addition McClellan was relieved of his authority over troops in the West and was put in charge only of the Army of the Potomac.

In hopes of defeating Grant before he could be reinforced by Buell, in early April Johnston attacked Grant at Pittsburgh Landing near the Tennessee/Mississippi border where Grant narrowly emerged victorious. The 20,000 Union and Confederate casualties at the Battle of Shiloh disabused the North of the hope of a rolling victory over the South in the West. At the same time, however, it planted the Union boot firmly and deeply in Confederate territory. In July, Lincoln promoted Halleck to the position of General-in-Chief of the Union armies and for all practical purposes, Grant became a department commander. In spite of these changes, it would be still fifteen months before Grant, Gen. William T. Sherman and Adm. David D. Porter could deliver the crowning blow to the Confederates in the West--the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863.

In a somewhat ironic twist of history, the contemporary who provided perhaps the broadest, most prescient view of the strategic importance of Tennessee River campaign was Karl Marx. When the war broke out, Marx and Frederich Engels were living in London, exiles from the 1848 German revolution. Marx was a columnist both for the New York Herald Tribune and Vienna's Die Presse. Writing in the Austrian paper on March 27, 1862, Marx proclaimed that the Tennessee River campaign molded the true strategic character of the war. The Potomac was not the important theater, as success there would yield nothing militarily. Following the Confederate relinquishment of Kentucky and Tennessee, however, Union forces, east and west, could now operate in concert. Before they were too far apart and operated on different lines. Moreover, the Confederacy had been a compact whole. As a result of the Tennessee victories, a great wedge had been driven into the Confederacy that allowed for a direct Union line from Virginia through Tennessee to the trans-Mississippi. Given that there was no populous national urban center at the heart of the Confederacy, its geographic backbone had to be broken to achieve victory: The Confederate backbone was the state of Georgia.

Of course, Marx was right. But first, as the Union leadership correctly perceived, the Mississippi had to be taken to close down support from the Western states, particularly Texas (not just Missouri as Marx wrote), as it supplied formidable numbers of men and amounts of supplies, as well as foreign goods through Mexico. In testimony to Marx's clear vision regarding Tennessee, note that Ulysses Grant was promoted to General-in-Chief after the Battle of Chattanooga that permanently secured that state for the Union. Then Sherman marched into Georgia. 35.

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Although a few members of Congress had known about the Tennessee River plan and that one had originally been submitted by Carroll, the administration tried to keep her responsibility for the campaign secret. In spite of these efforts, because Congress was so relieved that victories had finally taken place, Rep. Roscoe Conkling introduced a resolution on February 24, 1862, that thanked Generals Halleck and Grant for planning the "recent movements in their respective divisions" and for the men and officers for achieving victories. But Conkling further requested that the action lie over until:

Some of those making a recommendation for a deferral of action knew who shared responsibility and that it would not do to reveal it at that time.

According to Carroll soon after the congressional debates, she spoke to Assistant Secretary Scott and he said that she, ". . . .'acted very properly in the matter; that there is no question of her being entitled to the vote of thanks by Congress; that she has saved incalculable millions to the country, etc., but that it would not do while the struggle lasted to make a public claim;" As for Carroll herself, she told Blackwell, "I was present through it [the Conkling resolution debates] all and could at any moment have satisfied Congress and the world as to the authorship of the plan, but from prudential reasons, I refrained from uttering a word." Congressman Albert Gallatin Riddle later wrote that when members asked Lincoln or Stanton who was responsible for the victory, they replied that secrecy was required and would not reveal the identity of the responsible person. 36.

Following the victories at Forts Henry and Donelson, the administration now could envision an overall military campaign plan for the Western region. Once the major army and navy objectives were clear, it was much easier for Lincoln to make decisions as to the capabilities of his commanders in the field and on the rivers. Then he could make personnel changes on the basis of success or defeat and this he proceeded to do.

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As was typical of her nature, the submission of the November 30, Tennessee River plan was not sufficient for Carroll. Through 1862, she sent Stanton several letters further detailing information received from the river boat Capt. Charles Scott, then in the field with Grant, and giving additional ideas as to the course of military operations. Blackwell reported that a visitor to her room in 1861 found that it:

In a letter dated March 26, 1862, Carroll advised Stanton that the Union column be strengthened to seize the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as the readiest means of reducing Island No. 10 on the Mississippi River and all enemy strongholds south to Memphis. It read in part:

The option presented was an extension of her thinking that if the Union armies had continued to press south at a rapid pace, the Confederates would have been forced to evacuate points north of the Union line in order not to be cut off and surrounded. And this is exactly what happened. Halleck arrived in Tennessee four days after the Battle of Shiloh and spent the next three weeks and one month moving his forces the twenty-two miles from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth, Mississippi. By the time he arrived at Corinth on May 30, Beauregard had already abandoned it. During this time (April and May), above this line three Confederate strongholds remained to be taken: Island No. 10, an island in the Mississippi to which General Polk had moved his arms and supplies when he abandoned Columbus; Fort Pillow, a garrison perched on the bluffs of the Mississippi; and Memphis further south, also situated on the banks of that great muddy river. 37.

At the beginning of March, Maj. Gen. John Pope and Foote launched a joint operation against Island No. 10 and enemy forces in the environs. Although Pope had taken the town of New Madrid early in the month, the problem was getting Foote's fleet past the Confederate batteries on the island, as well as those on the Tennessee side of the river. Without the use of the boats as transports, Pope's men could not cross the river to attack the Confederate positions. Having failed to reduce the Confederate batteries, during the first week of April, two of Foote's gunboats successfully ran them at night and arrived at New Madrid to transport Pope's men across the Mississippi. On April 7, Confederate forces on Island No. 10, finding themselves surrounded, surrendered to Flag Officer Foote; the rebels began to abandon the batteries on the Tennessee shore in the face of Pope's advancing troops and upon Pope's pursuit surrendered to him, on the 8th. Foote and Pope then moved on Fort Pillow. At the beginning of May, Capt. Charles H. Davis replaced Foote because of wounds he had received at Fort Donelson. Within seven weeks Corinth was occupied by Halleck making the Confederate position at Fort Pillow untenable and it was abandoned in early June. From Fort Pillow, the Union gunboat fleet under Davis's command descended the river, arrived at Memphis, and engaged the Confederate gunboats and rams at that city. Once these were sunk, disabled or had fled, the Confederate army evacuated that city and it was surrendered and occupied by Union troops on June 6.

Regarding, Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow, Carroll's point in her March 26 letter was that had Halleck moved faster against Corinth, Pope and Foote would not have had to spend the month of March trying to reduce the island for the occupation of Corinth would have made it untenable, as was the case with Fort Pillow and Memphis. After Halleck occupied Corinth, the railroad link to Memphis was cut and the Confederate positions at Forts Pillow and Randolph and Memphis were flanked. The two forts were evacuated, but the Confederates decided to try hold Memphis, an arms manufacturing center. In spite of the impact Corinth had on the viability of Confederate positions on the river, ultimately the Southern gunboat fleet would have had to have been dealt with. After the fleet’s virtual destruction during the battle for Memphis, the Mississippi River was cleared south to Vicksburg, the next high ground the U.S. Navy and Army had to take. 38.